Håkon Måløy demonstrates a cross-domain prompt-injection chain in Microsoft 365 Copilot for Word: hidden instructions in an external document alter a generated report and copy themselves into the output, which becomes a trusted carrier in later drafting sessions. Microsoft confirmed the behavior and deployed payload-specific mitigations, but Måløy reproduced the attack class after 144 days of coordinated disclosure; each hop still requires another Copilot drafting or editing operation.
Context Collapse: hidden Word prompts propagate through Copilot-generated documents
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